It is undoubtedly difficult to dispute the assertion that freedom is the central societal value of modernity, as Axel Honneth, among others, has recently argued in Freedom’s Right. One might also see this fact as the primary source of modernity’s instability: its central value – freedom – is as contested and ambiguous as possible. Today we seem to be far from any philosophical, political-theoretic and everyday consensus on the meaning of freedom. Challenges that we also face today, including the threat of pandemics, climate change or ultimately of our self-destruction, create a greater practical urgency than ever of finding a way out of the impasse between the competing conceptions of freedom. Yet, independent of debates and controversies surrounding the notion of freedom, it remains the central action-guiding principle of democratic politics.
The broad tradition of Critical Theory might provide some initial tools for this purpose, since it defines freedom roughly as not being (entirely) subjected to “instrumental reason” – to the imperative of maximizing the efficiency of our actions directed toward individual and collective self-preservation. For Critical Theory freedom equals our capacity to not follow institutionalized and formalised norms blindly, to reflect on them and change them, even to create institutions that are largely free from instrumental reason (a deliberative-democratic arena, for example, or a university that fosters free intellectual inquiry rather than preparation for the labour market). This capacity is also the essence of what we define as democratic and solidary engagement.